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1CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Bem’s (1967) self perception theory states that we know ourselves the same way we 
come to know others; we objectify ourselves and examine our behavioral interactions 
with others. That is, we compare ourselves to others, learning how we are the same and 
how we are unique. Festinger (1954) more directly addressed the necessity of comparison 
in his social comparison theory which postulates that humans have an innate need (or 
more appropriately a drive) to evaluate themselves in terms of their abilities and opinions 
and, in the absence of absolutes, these comparisons must be made relative to social 
groups. What has emerged from much of the social psychological research on social 
comparison is the realization that personal and group identities are inextricably 
intermeshed.  
The Ingroup Bias Effect 
 One of the most consistent findings in the literature regarding intergroup relations 
is the phenomenon of ingroup favoritism, or the ingroup bias effect. Social Identity 
Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner & Brown, 1978) suggests that ingroup bias is 
driven by social identity needs and emanates from group members’ attempts to achieve 
positive distinctiveness (i.e., favorable evaluation) of their group.  Indeed, the mere act of 
categorizing oneself as a member of a particular group is often sufficient to produce a 
preference for ingroup characteristics relative to those possessed by a comparison 
1outgroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).  It has also been suggested that because personal and 
group identity are so closely linked, identification with, and preference for, ingroup traits 
serves the dual purpose of achieving both positive group distinction and individual self-
esteem.   
The Outgroup Bias Effect  
Although social identity theory has been successful in clarifying many of the 
processes underlying ingroup favoritism, it has failed to account for one of the more 
perplexing findings in the social psychological literature, namely, the outgroup bias effect 
among members of disadvantaged groups.  In contrast to the ingroup bias effect, 
outgroup bias is the preference for outgroup characteristics, more specifically the 
favoring of higher status group values and beliefs by members of lower status groups. 
Ingroup favoritism among high status groups and outgroup favoritism among low status 
groups is well documented. Mullen, Brown, and Smith (1992) reported a meta-analytic 
integration of 137 tests of ingroup favoritism showing unanimous (100%) ingroup 
favoritism among high status group members; in contrast, low status members 
demonstrated only 15% ingroup favoritism and 85% outgroup favoritism on dimensions 
typically associated with the higher status group.   
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the outgroup bias phenomenon is that 
members of disadvantaged groups demonstrate a tendency to favor the values of higher 
status groups, even when such endorsement compromises their own personal and group 
interests (Jost & Banaji, 1994).  This often results in members of disadvantaged groups 
construing their social outcomes in a manner that legitimizes their disadvantaged position 
(i.e., justifies their lower status).  Moreover, minority group members with the lowest 
2status (i.e., those with the most to lose) are also the most likely to endorse an outgroup 
preference for personal dimensions associated with high status groups (Rudman, 
Feinberg, & Fairchild, 2002). 
System Justification Theory 
 In the mid to late 1990s, System Justification Theory emerged as an integrative 
theory unifying and extending other perspectives (e.g., Social Identity Theory, Conflict 
Theory), articulating a motivation to legitimize the status quo, or the need to believe that 
the world in which we live works the way it does because it is just and even natural (Jost, 
Banaji, & Nosek, 2004).  Indeed, system justification theory postulates that the outgroup 
bias effect results from the tendency for people to: (a) perceive the status quo as just and 
(b) attach greater value to domains in which higher status groups excel resulting in status 
value asymmetry.  In other words, for members of dominant majority groups there exists 
a congruency between group-based values (what works best for them) and the larger 
system values; they are the same. However, for minority group members there is an 
inherent inconsistency, because what is socially and economically advantageous for the 
self and one’s group often conflicts with what works best for the larger system. As a 
result, members of minority groups often construe their social standing in ways that 
simultaneously devalue dimensions on which they excel and concede preferential value 
for higher status outgroup dimensions.   
Due in part to the pervasive tendency for people to justify existing status 
hierarchies, members of lower status groups are in the unenviable position of endorsing 
status quo social arrangements resulting in the simultaneous valuation of characteristics 
possessed by members of high status groups and devaluation of domains which 
3characterize their own group. This tendency to defend existing social hierarchies leads to 
the prediction that members of low status groups are less likely to attribute inequitable 
outcomes to prejudice and discrimination, but rather to their own personal inadequacy 
(Major, McCoy, Schmader, Gramzow, Levin, & Sidanius, 2002). In this way, perceptions 
of lower status group members are consistent with those in higher status groups and serve 
to maintain the stability of the larger social system, one that often works against the best 
interests of subordinate groups (Major, 1994; Major & Schmader, 2001).  
 Early attempts to understand the status value asymmetry phenomenon derive from 
the works of Marx. Fundamental to Marxism is the dominant ideology hypothesis (Marx 
& Engels, 1946/1970). The dominant ideology hypothesis states that as a consequence of 
being able to structure a socioeconomic system with an inequitable distribution of 
economic benefits the majority group is able to legitimize their values and beliefs by 
orchestrating the intellectual and cultural content in education, religion, and 
communication, thereby controlling the production of ideas available for discourse and 
determining the parameters of what constitutes appropriate discourse. Through these 
seemingly innocuous, everyday processes the majority group’s values (e.g., individual 
responsibility, personal causation, and personal merit) are legitimized as privileged 
cultural narratives and serve to mask potential group-based (e.g., racial) inequities, 
creating the appearance of a fair and just social system.    
 Gramsci (1971) described a theory of hegemony which is foundational in its 
influence on system justification theory and status value asymmetry (Jost, 2001).  
Hegemony is from the Greek word meaning “to lead”; its contemporary usage, however, 
denotes the dominance of one group over another. Theories of hegemony are concerned 
4with how group dominance is achieved and how majority groups maintain power through 
the persuasion of subordinate classes to internalize majority group values and beliefs to 
sustain the status quo.  
 Gramsci’s theory emphasizes the fact that consent from subordinate groups is not 
automatic and that ideological domination must be manufactured.  In Gramsci’s 
hegemony theory, majority group domination is accomplished initially through coercive 
repression by state institutions, followed by persuasion through established civil 
institutions. Being able to create political power by dominating intellectual and moral 
leadership, in effect, allows rulers to manufacture consent from subordinates to be ruled 
(Zelditch, 2001).  It cannot be emphasized enough that the stark reality of hegemony 
functions like an ambient light, just below the surface and subtle enough to exist without 
distinction. This makes it all the more powerful and effective because the concomitant 
internalization of inequity is accomplished largely outside awareness. The result is a false 
consciousness (Marx & Engels, 1946/1970) that legitimizes the dominant-subordinate 
relationship, which would not be possible without the willing endorsement and 
participation of the subordinate group in this process.  
 System Justification Theory attempts to describe this super-ordinate process that 
functions to legitimize existing social hierarchies and bonds self and social identity.  
System Justification Theory explains both the outgroup bias effect and the status value 
asymmetry effect in terms of three predominant variables which be discussed here. They 
are: status beliefs, perceived legitimacy, and group identity.  There are specific structural 
preconditions for the emergence of status-beliefs and for understanding their significance 
in the context of system justification.  First, structural inequality between social groups is 
5the critical precondition for the development of status beliefs; inequality being inherent in 
the very definition of the word status.  Indeed, simply making a distinction between 
people is enough to foster beliefs that favor one’s own group (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1993; 
Greenwald, McGee, & Swartz, 2003).  Second, structural inequality produces an 
inequitable distribution of valued resources, such as wealth and access to educational 
opportunities with concomitant privilege and social power (Weber, 1947). Third, group-
based social hierarchies are the most pronounced structural feature of all human cultures 
(Brown, 1991; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and the most identifiable functional consequence 
of this is oppression and exploitation. Fourth, a group-based hierarchical system reflects 
social arrangements in which individuals enjoy power, prestige, and privilege simply by 
virtue of their membership in particular socially structured groups (Sidanius, Pratto, Van 
Laar, & Levin, 2004).  
The structural inequality inherent in these hierarchies creates social distinctions 
that organize social relations, which also represent status distinctions (Sidanius, 1993). 
Typically, these distinctions are widely held status beliefs regarding competence and 
worth that favor one category of the social distinction (e.g., men) over others (e.g., 
women) (Burgess & Borgida, 1998). In this way, status beliefs represent cultural 
schemas, or heuristics, for organizing social relations, but unfortunately on unequal terms 
(Ridgeway, 2001). 
 Status beliefs are unique and differ from mere ingroup favoritism in two ways.  
First, by definition, status beliefs ascribe greater worth and competence to one social 
category as compared to another.  Interestingly, status beliefs also impute lesser valued, 
but subjectively positive, characteristics (warmth, nurturance) to the status disadvantaged 
6group (Conway, Pizzamiglio, & Mount, 1996; Glick & Fiske, 2001). Thus, status beliefs 
bind the socially devalued group to the collective social reality; not only by persuading 
them to accept that they are less competent, but also that they are distinctively better in 
other, less important ways (Eagly, 1987). As cultural schemas, status beliefs 
simultaneously include the disadvantaged as people of some value and justify their lesser 
position in society. 
 Status beliefs are also uniquely different from ingroup favoritism in that they are 
consensual.  In other words, people in all categories of social distinction must agree, or at 
least concede, that one class in the social hierarchy is considered to be superior (Jost & 
Banaji, 1994; Ridgeway, 2001). In essence, status beliefs are beliefs about what most 
people think. Importantly, because status beliefs are consensual, it is the beliefs held by 
members of the devalued group that are essential to the successful formation and 
maintenance of status beliefs. To illustrate, in a series of five survey studies Jost, Pelham, 
Sheldon, and Sullivan (2003) showed that for a variety of system beliefs (i.e., willingness 
to limit freedom in defense of the system, trust in the government, belief in 
disproportionate wealth as beneficial, and belief in a meritocracy), members of low status 
groups were uniformly more likely to express satisfaction with the existing system and 
their own socioeconomic status despite the fact that these principles often do not serve to 
promote their own best interest and limit important discourse regarding group-based 
inequities. Thus, members of devalued social categories must overcome the natural 
tendency to favor their ingroup and accept that, as a matter of social reality, the majority 
group is more respected and competent. 
7Because of the consensual nature of status beliefs, they take on a sense of 
legitimacy or conventional acceptance. It is this social validity that objectifies status 
beliefs for people making them seem like inevitable social facts that must be dealt with, 
regardless of the negative impact on them or their social group (Berger and Luckmann, 
1967).  It is primarily the social validity element that legitimizes status beliefs and 
elevates them to such a level that they are bestowed moral value, capable of encouraging 
behaviors that support them and constraining behaviors that dissent from them. 
Legitimacy perceptions derive from the individual perceiving his or her own situation as 
just or unjust. That is, legitimacy appraisals are subjective perceptions of fairness or 
justice regarding the distribution of wealth, status, or power. Although these subjective 
perceptions are held individually, they gain their power to legitimize social inequality and 
provide a “cushion of support” (Rasinski, Tyler, & Fridkin, 1985, p.386) for the status 
quo through their collective endorsement within a culture (Major, 1994). 
 There is considerable evidence to suggest that when outcomes, including negative 
ones, are perceived as legitimate, individuals are more likely to construe these outcomes 
as fair, just, and deserving (Schmader, Major, Eccleston, & McCoy, 2001).  In other 
words, members of disadvantaged groups are less likely to attribute negative and 
potentially discriminating outcomes to unfair treatment if those outcomes are perceived 
as deserving or legitimate.  Likewise, disadvantaged group members are more likely to 
consider these same outcomes as due to discrimination and unfair treatment if they are 
seen as unjust or illegitimate (Major & Schmader, 2001). 
 In addition to status beliefs and legitimacy appraisals, in-group identification is 
also important to understanding the outgroup bias phenomenon.  Indeed, because the 
8conflict between one’s group interests and larger system interests lies at the heart of both 
the outgroup bias effect and status value asymmetry, the extent to which an individual 
sees him/herself as an integral member of the subordinate group can affect the degree of 
observable outgroup preference (Jost, Burgess, & Mosso, 2001).  Jost and Banaji (1994) 
point out, for example, that under circumstances of extreme ingroup identification, 
system justification motives can be overwhelmed by personal and/or group identification 
needs.  In this instance, unfavorable comparisons of one’s group with a superior outgroup 
can function to strengthen ingroup bias as a means of reaffirming group worth and 
individual social identity (Spears, Jetten, & Doosje, 2001). 
 Conversely, members of low status groups who only weakly identify with their 
group may be more likely to accept the inferiority of their group and to express outgroup 
favoritism (Jost et al., 2001).  There is evidence to suggest that, indeed, individuals who 
show weak identification with their own low status group are less likely to stick with 
their group, and are more likely to simultaneously acknowledge their group’s inferiority 
and identify themselves as exceptions to the group’s inferior status in response to threat 
by a higher status outgroup (Ellemers, 2001; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997). 
 Since the first observation of the outgroup bias effect, studies have explored this 
phenomenon in a number of marginalized minority groups, including African Americans, 
Latino Americans, and indigent populations (e.g., Jost et al., 2003). However, consistent 
with other areas of the psychological literature, there is a complete absence of research 
examining the outgroup bias effect, or social cognition more generally, in Native 
Americans. The outgroup bias effect may be particularly salient in Native American 
groups for two reasons. First, Native Americans are the most disadvantaged racial 
9minority group in America (US Census Bureau, 2002). As a number of authors have 
pointed out, minority group members with the lowest status are the ones most likely to 
endorse an outgroup preference for personal dimensions associated with the higher status 
majority group (e.g., Rudman, Feinberg, & Fairchild, 2002). As the most 
socioeconomically oppressed ethnic group in this country, Native Americans may be 
acutely vulnerable to the pressure of favoring dominant group values and the inadvertent 
endorsement of unequal status quo arrangements.  
 Second, historically the larger culture’s dealings with Native Americans are most 
aptly characterized as unabashed attempts to silence traditional Native culture and 
assimilate Native Americans into the mainstream culture. Whether it was early settlers 
gaining the trust of and then exploiting the primitive savage, the Federal Government’s 
forced removal of thousands of Indian citizens onto reservations, or the boarding schools’ 
attempts to strip children of their traditional names, customs, and language, the message 
has been clear: assimilate, stay in your place, or die. Faced with these options, it is little 
surprise to find that Native Americans have come to internalize the larger system’s 
beliefs, including negative perceptions of themselves (e.g., Fryberg, 2002). 
 Because Native Americans represent one of the most socio-economically 
oppressed racial groups in the history of this country and because of the continued 
marginalization of the Native American culture, it would be expected that system 
justification theory predictions regarding outgroup favoritism and status value asymmetry 
would be pronounced for members of this group. In this paper an attempt will be made to 
demonstrate the importance of perceived legitimacy for understanding ingroup-outgroup 
preference for both status-relevant and status-irrelevant traits and the role of group 
10
identity in this process. Further, a study is proposed that will examine this social 
cognitive process in a sample of Native American college students. To accomplish this, 
an overview of the system justification literature will be provided in Chapter II, followed 
by an operational description of the present study and hypothesized outcomes in Chapter 
III. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
What has emerged from much of the social psychology research on social 
comparison is the realization that personal and group identities are inextricably 
intermeshed. Because personal and group identity are so closely linked, it has been 
suggested that identification with and preference for ingroup traits emanates from group 
members’ attempts to achieve both positive distinctiveness (i.e., favorable evaluation) of 
their group and individual self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In fact, one of the most 
consistent findings in the literature regarding intergroup comparisons is the phenomenon 
of ingroup favoritism, or the ingroup bias effect. In other words, all other things being 
equal, members of groups typically show favoritism for beliefs, values, and attitudes that 
are similar to their group and devalue those that are dissimilar from their group. 
Given that group members typically prefer qualities similar to their ingroup, 
perhaps one of the most perplexing findings in the social psychological literature is the 
tendency for members of disadvantaged groups to simultaneously endorse unequal status 
quo social hierarchies and devalue dimensions on which their group excels, while 
conceding preferential value for higher status outgroup traits (Jost & Burgess, 2000). This 
outgroup bias effect often results in members of disadvantaged groups construing their 
social outcomes in a manner that legitimizes their disadvantaged social and/or economic 
position. Interestingly, disadvantaged group members with the lowest status (i.e., those 
13
with the most to lose) are also the most likely to endorse an outgroup preference for 
dimensions associated with high status groups (Rudman et al. 2002). 
 System Justification Theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994) proposes that, unlike members 
of the dominant majority group, disadvantaged group members face an inherent 
inconsistency between group-based values and larger system values, because what is 
socially and economically advantageous for the self and one’s group often conflicts with 
what favors larger dominant system values. Thus, members of lower status groups are in 
the unenviable position of accepting status quo social arrangements, potentially resulting 
in the simultaneous valuation of characteristics possessed by members of high status 
groups and devaluation of domains which characterize their own group. 
 Jost et al. (2003) sought to test the hypothesis that those who are the most 
disadvantaged by the system are also those most likely to justify the system by supporting 
and defending its legitimacy.  The strongest form of system justification theory derives 
from the logic of cognitive dissonance theory and predicts people who are the most 
disadvantaged by the status quo will experience the greatest need to reduce ideological 
dissonance in order to maintain their beliefs. This suggests that authority figures who 
represent the larger dominant system should be viewed as above reproach and that 
inequality among individuals and groups are not only justified but necessary. Jost et al. 
(2003) sought evidence for these predictions in five survey studies. 
 The first survey sought to examine the influence of income, race, and education 
on individuals’ perceived willingness to limit criticism of the government. Their 
hypothesis was that more disadvantaged groups would be more inclined to favor limiting 
personal freedom and criticism of the government. In a 1976 telephone survey of 1345 
14
employed and unemployed workers from 150 metropolitan areas, participants were 
asked: a) if they would be willing to limit criticism of the government by the press in 
order to better solve the nation’s problems, and b) if they would also be willing to limit 
the rights of citizens to criticize the government. Logistical regression analysis revealed a 
reliable negative linear effect in support of the prediction of greater willingness on the 
part of low-income individuals to limit personal freedom for the good of the larger group. 
With regard to race it was found that African Americans were more likely than European 
Americans to support such limitations. With income controlled, it was found that though 
the effects were somewhat marginal, the less educated were more defensive of the 
system. No effects for gender were observed.  
 The second survey compared poor and wealthy American Latinos examining 
their agreement with, and trust in, government. In a 1989 survey, 2485 Latino-Americans 
were asked two questions regarding their trust in the government: a) how much of the 
time they thought government officials could be trusted to do what is right, and b) 
whether they thought the government was run by the few looking out for their own 
interests or for the benefit of all. For the first question regression analysis yielded a 
reliable linear effect indicating that less affluent Latinos were significantly more trusting 
of government officials to do the right thing. Analysis of the second question also 
revealed a linear trend, with increased poverty accompanying increased belief in the 
government being run for the benefit of all. Both of these outcomes support the 
ideological dissonance prediction. 
 Survey three examined the relationship between income and the belief that large 
differences in pay are necessary: a) to get people to work hard, and b) as an incentive for 
15
individual effort. In two different surveys of US households between 1983 and 1987 a 
total of 1396 people were asked if difference in pay was necessary to motivate effort. The 
surveys asked slightly different questions. The first was phrased “In order to get people to 
work hard…” and the second was worded to the effect, “Only if differences in income are 
large enough…” (Jost et al., 2003, p. 18). The majority of all respondents believed that 
large income differences are necessary.  Moreover, as in the previous studies, regression 
analysis revealed a significant negative linear effect; the lower the income the stronger 
the belief.  
 African and European Americans living in the Northern and Southern United 
States were compared in the fourth survey. The hypothesis deduced from system 
justification theory was that the more disadvantaged the group, the greater the likelihood 
that they would endorse the meritocractic, a belief that success accompanies hard work. 
Because poverty has both racial and geographic associations, Southern Blacks would be 
expected to be doubly disadvantaged. In other words, according to the ideological 
dissonance hypothesis, they should also be the most likely group of all to embrace the 
justification of the system. Responses from 1048 people were obtained regarding their 
belief that: a) anyone who is willing to work hard has a good chance of succeeding, and 
b) if people work hard enough they can make a good life for themselves. Analysis 
revealed that African Americans earned significantly less than European Americans and 
Southerners earned marginally less than Northerners.  Results showed that Southern 
African Americans and poorer African Americans are more likely to endorse meritocratic 
beliefs than were Northern African Americans and affluent African Americans.  Further, 
as predicted, comparisons of poor and more affluent Southern African Americans 
16
revealed that the relationship between poverty and beliefs in the myth of hard work and 
success were more pronounced for poor Southern Blacks.  
 The final survey in this series also examined beliefs regarding the larger system 
as meritocratic among economically disadvantaged individuals.  However, this survey 
tested the hypothesis that individuals with strong meritocratic beliefs will also be more 
likely to express satisfaction with their own economic situation, thereby reducing 
ideological dissonance. A sample of 788 respondents to a 1987 survey was used to 
examine “legitimization of economic inequality” (pg. 27). Respondents were asked to 
rate the extent to which they believed large differences in income are necessary for 
America’s prosperity. Other survey items were used to assess meritocratic ideology and 
the personal characteristics necessary to achieve success. Economic satisfaction was 
measured for satisfaction with job, financial situation, and life in general. Relationships 
among these variables were assessed using a structural equation model. Results indicated 
that, as predicted, socio-economic status was inversely related to legitimization of 
inequality such that individuals with lower income were more likely to perceive 
economic inequality as just. Further, greater endorsement of meritocracy was positively 
related to economic satisfaction, as would be expected by the dissonance hypothesis. 
Interestingly, African Americans were less satisfied with their economic situation, but 
more likely to perceive economic inequality as legitimate. In combination, these five 
studies provide strong support for the suggestion that enhanced system justification 
among the disadvantaged is motivated by the ideological dissonance resulting from social 
inequality. This explains the paradox of why those who would profit most from not 
trusting the system, questioning its worth, and changing it are the least likely to do so.  
17
There is abundant evidence that low status minorities exhibit outgroup favoritism 
by endorsing the status quo, paradoxically, to their detriment. However, the question as to 
why this might be so has been largely unexplored until recently. Proponents of Social 
Identity Theory (e.g., Turner & Brown, 1978) recognized the problem early on by 
suggesting that group members’ need for positive distinctiveness and ingroup favoritism 
is more likely if their low status is not perceived as “inherent, immutable or fully 
legitimate” (pg. 207). However, Social Identity theorists failed to specify the conditions 
that would lead to these perceptions or what outcomes are likely in the presence of such 
perceptions of legitimacy.  System Justification Theory researchers have examined 
specifically the significance of perceived legitimacy to understanding outgroup 
favoritism.  
 Jost and Burgess (2000) examined ingroup-outgroup bias in low status groups and 
the role of legitimacy appraisals in a sample of 131 undergraduate students at the 
University of Maryland (UM).  These authors also distinguished between status-relevant 
traits (i.e., those related to achievement) and status-irrelevant traits (i.e., socioemotional 
traits unrelated to achievement).  In this study, group status was experimentally 
manipulated by providing participants with bogus statistics regarding socioeconomic 
success for their alumni and for alumni from the University of Virginia (UV). Half the 
participants were led to believe their alumni were more successful than those from the 
rival school (i.e., high status condition) and half were led to believe their alumni were 
substantially less successful (i.e., low status condition). Following this induction phase of 
the experiment, students were asked to rate each of the schools on both status relevant 
and status irrelevant characteristics. Status relevant items were: intelligent, hard working, 
18
and skilled at verbal reasoning; status irrelevant items were: friendly, honest, and 
interesting.  
Results revealed that students assigned to the higher status condition displayed 
ingroup favoritism on status relevant traits. In other words, relative to those assigned to 
the lower status group, participants who were led to believe that UM alumni were more 
successful than UV alumni tended to rate their own group (UM) as possessing more traits 
associated with socioeconomic advantage. The opposite pattern was observed for 
students assigned to the lower status group. Relative to those assigned to the higher status 
group, participants who believed UV alumni were more successful than UM alumni rated 
the outgroup (UV) higher on traits associated with socioeconomic advantage. 
 In addition to assessing ingroup/outgroup favoritism, Jost and Burgess obtained 
assessments for fairness, justifiability, and legitimacy regarding the socioeconomic 
success differences between the two universities. These were combined into a general 
index of perceived legitimacy. Results revealed that perceived legitimacy was positively 
correlated with increased ingroup favoritism on status relevant traits (i.e., status value 
symmetry) for participants in the high status condition. For participants in the low status 
condition, increased perceived legitimacy was associated with both lower ingroup 
favoritism and higher outgroup favoritism on these same status relevant traits (i.e., status 
value asymmetry). 
A follow-up experiment reported by Jost (2001) replicated this procedure at a 
different university and incorporated a manipulation for perceived legitimacy. Students at 
the University of California at Santa Barbara (UCSB) were first informed that their 
alumni were less socioeconomically successful than a comparison group from the 
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University of California – Los Angeles (UCLA). They were then exposed to essays 
supposedly written by members of their own ingroup designed to reaffirm (i.e., 
legitimize) or alter (i.e., delegitimize) their perceptions of the socioeconomic status data. 
Participants then provided ingroup and outgroup ratings on both status relevant (i.e., 
achievement) and status irrelevant (i.e., socioemotional) traits.  
Twelve percent of the participants were not persuaded by the essays. However, 
the remaining students who believed that the essays were either legitimate or illegitimate 
displayed effects similar to those found in Jost and Burgess (2000). Specifically, students 
who read essays affirming their lower socioeconomic status (high legitimacy condition) 
demonstrated greater outgroup favoritism on status relevant (achievement) traits such as 
intelligent, hard-working, and skilled at verbal reasoning, compared to those in the low 
legitimacy condition. High legitimacy participants also showed less ingroup favoritism 
on status irrelevant (socioemotional) traits (e.g., honest, friendly, interesting) relative to 
low legitimacy participants. 
 Schmader et al. (2001) reported the results of two studies demonstrating outgroup 
bias and status value asymmetry under conditions of assumed legitimacy and one 
experiment showing that perceived illegitimacy can mitigate the outgroup bias effect. In 
all three studies students at the University of California Santa Barbara (UCSB) were 
given a 50-item test for a fictitious personality trait called surgency, which was described 
simply as a positive characteristic related to academic success. The test consisted of a 
wide variety of personality questions to mask the trait that was supposedly being 
measure. While the test was being scored participants were told that the goal of the 
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research was to examine possible differences in surgency among students at different 
universities and colleges.  
 In the first study, the relative status of the ingroup was manipulated by varying 
the comparison school. Specifically, in the low status condition, students were told the 
comparison school was Stanford University. In the high status condition the comparison 
school was identified as the local City College. In addition, students were provided with a 
summary sheet adapted from Jost and Burgess (2000) describing socioeconomic 
differences between the schools. Following this induction phase, participants were given 
performance information for the surgency test. In the low status ingroup condition, 
surgency scores were reported to be much higher at Stanford; in the high status condition, 
UCSB scores were reported as significantly higher than the local City College. The 
primary dependent measures assessed the perceived general value of surgency and the 
perceived utility of surgency for both status relevant (i.e., career) and status irrelevant 
(i.e., social) success. 
 As predicted a status value asymmetry effect was observed for perceived value of 
surgency.  Specifically, greater ingroup valuing of surgency was observed when UCSB 
participants were told their group surgency scores exceeded City College. Less valuing of 
surgency was observed when they were led to believe their surgency scores were lower 
than City College scores. When comparing themselves to Stanford students, no 
differences were observed in the valuing of surgency. In fact there was a small but 
nonsignificant greater value placed on the surgency attribute when Stanford students’ 
surgency scores were reported as higher than the UCSB ingroup. 
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Perceived utility showed a similar pattern. Surgency was perceived as being 
important to career success when UCSB students were told they scored higher on 
surgency than the City College group. Perceived utility of surgency for career success 
was lower for UCSB students when they were led to believe the City College group 
obtained higher surgency scores. Surgency was also seen as more relevant to career 
success when participants were told Stanford students scored higher on surgency than 
UCSB students. Interestingly, the social utility of surgency was viewed as useful when 
UCSB students were told they scored higher on surgency regardless of high-low 
comparison group (City College or Stanford). Results of this study demonstrate the 
tendency to place greater value on traits related to success when they are associated with 
members of higher status groups. 
 The second study was not an experiment, but sought to replicate these status value 
asymmetry effects comparing a sample of 79 male and female college students from the 
University of Minnesota. It was hypothesized that men would devalue surgency if they 
were told that women scored higher on this attribute, but women would value the domain 
when led to believe men scored higher. The procedures and measures were identical to 
Schmader et al. (2001; Study 1). Results revealed that men valued surgency to a greater 
degree when they were led to believe that they scored higher than women and devalued it 
when told that women scored higher. Women valued surgency both when they thought 
they scored higher and when they thought men scored higher. With regard to career 
utility, men perceived surgency as relevant only when they were told they scored higher 
on this trait than women; women rated surgency as high in career utility regardless of 
who scored higher. Men saw surgency as equally related to social utility, whereas women 
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saw surgency as having greater social utility only when they were told they scored higher 
than men. In Study 1, surgency was considered relevant only to career utility. However, 
in this study surgency was perceived as relevant to career success for men and to social 
success for women, perhaps because men and women are generally stereotyped relative 
to these two dimensions. 
 The status value asymmetry effects observed in these two studies were assumed to 
be a function of the perceived legitimacy of the status hierarchy information presented 
(i.e., academic, achievement potential). Study 3 was designed to test this directly by 
manipulating perceived legitimacy. Using the same procedure as in Study 1, an additional 
manipulation was added in which participants were provided with information that either 
legitimized or discredited the status differences in intelligence and academic potential at 
the comparison schools.  
 Similar to Study 1, results indicated that UCSB students who were provided with 
information legitimizing the status differences between the two schools tended to devalue 
surgency when they were told that City College students had higher surgency scores, but 
not when Stanford students scored higher. However, when information was provided that 
discredited (i.e., delegitimized) the validity of the status differences between students at 
the respective schools, status value symmetry rather than asymmetry was observed. In 
other words, surgency was not considered a valuable trait by the UCSB students when the 
status difference was seen as illegitimate or invalid, even when both low status (i.e., City 
College) and high status (i.e., Stanford) students scored higher on surgency. 
 In addition to status beliefs and legitimacy appraisals, in-group identification is 
also important to understanding the outgroup bias phenomenon. There is considerable
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evidence that, among members of low status groups, weak group identification can result
in the tendency for individuals to acquiesce to their group’s inferiority, to see themselves
as exceptions to their group’s lower status, and to abandon the group when threatened by
a higher status group (Ellemers, 2001; Spears et al., 1997).
Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje (1997; Experiment 1) examined the extent to which
high versus low ingroup identification determines individuals’ commitment to a low
status ingroup. In this experiment, participants completed a bogus task designed to give
them the impression that, based on their responses, the computer could calculate the
degree to which they identified with their ingroup (i.e., high-identifiers versus low-
identifiers). Manipulation checks determined the extent to which participants felt
committed to their assigned group. Following ingroup identification manipulation,
participants received feedback about the two groups’ (high versus low identifiers)
performance on a problem-solving task. Feedback was manipulated such that the
participant’s ingroup always performed more poorly than the outgroup, regardless of
whether they were in the low or high identifier group. Participants were given
instructions that either the group would remain the same throughout the course of the
experiment or that some participants would be allowed to change groups. Dependent
measures assessed perceived group homogeneity, commitment to the group, personal
identification with the group, and desire to leave the group.
Results revealed that, relative to the high identification group, participants in the
low identification group perceived their ingroup as less homogeneous and expressed a
greater desire to leave the group. Conversely, stronger commitment to the group was
observed among high identifiers. Results indicated that, among low status group
members, high versus low group identification directly influences individuals’
24
commitment to their ingroup and the desire to abandon the ingroup in favor of the higher
status outgroup, respectively (Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, & Hume, 2001).
Cadinu and Cerchioni (2001) examined the influence of group identity on ingroup
and outgroup favoritism across status relevant and status irrelevant traits. Emergency
medical service volunteers were asked to rate themselves as to their level of identification
with their professional association (i.e., ingroup). They were then given bogus positive,
negative, or no feedback regarding their association’s response time to an emergency call
as well as the response time of other regional associations (i.e., outgroups). Participants
were then asked to provide ratings regarding professional (status relevant) and
personality (status irrelevant) characteristics for both their ingroup and either a high or
low performance outgroup. They also rated how similar they felt to other volunteers in
their professional association.
Results indicated that when high ingroup identifiers received negative feedback in
the professional domain (i.e., low status condition) they tended to compensate by
increasing ingroup favoritism in the personality (status irrelevant) domain. Low ingroup
identifiers did not show this compensatory tendency. Instead, low identifiers distanced
themselves from their group (i.e., endorsed lower self-group similarity ratings) following
negative ingroup performance feedback. Taken together, these experiments suggest that, 
for both arbitrary and socially meaningful group designations, ingroup identity plays an 
influential role in determining the degree and direction of ingroup/outgroup preference. 
The current study 
Members of minority groups with the lowest status are most likely to demonstrate a 
preference for characteristics associated with higher status outgroups (Jost et al., 2003). 
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System Justification Theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994) attempts to explain this phenomenon 
by postulating a motivation, or tendency, on the part of individuals to legitimize the status 
quo, which serves to galvanize existing status beliefs and perpetuate unequal status 
hierarchies. The inequality inherent in these hierarchies creates social distinctions that 
organize social relations by ascribing greater worth and competence to one social 
category as compared to another, binding the socially devalued group to a collective 
social reality that induces them to accept that they are less competent, but also that they 
are distinctively better in other, less important ways (Ridgeway, 2001). 
 Because of the consensual nature of status beliefs, they take on a sense of 
legitimacy or conventional acceptance. It is this social validation that objectifies status 
beliefs and legitimizes them. For this reason, perceived legitimacy is crucial both for 
understanding the outgroup bias phenomenon and for maintaining existing structural 
inequalities (e.g., Jost, 2001; Schmader et al., 2001). In addition to status beliefs and 
legitimacy, the extent to which individuals identify with the subordinate ingroup 
influences ingroup/outgroup preferences. Members of low status groups who only weakly 
identify with their group may be more likely to accept the inferiority of their group, 
distance themselves from the group, and express less ingroup favoritism (e.g., Cadinu &
Cerchioni, 2001; Ellemers et al., 1997).
Although the outgroup bias effect has been examined in a number of marginalized 
minority groups (e.g., Jost et al., 2003), there is a complete absence of research 
examining this phenomenon, and social cognition more generally, in Native Americans. 
Because Native Americans are the most disadvantaged racial minority group in America 
(US Census Bureau, 2002), Native American individuals may be acutely vulnerable to 
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the pressure of favoring dominant group values and the inadvertent endorsement of 
unequal status quo arrangements. Also, because of the tremendous assimilation pressures 
placed on Native Americans throughout their history, Native Americans often internalize 
the larger system’s beliefs, including negative perceptions of themselves (e.g., Fryberg, 
2002). It is for these reasons that a study is proposed to examine the outgroup bias effect 
in a sample of Native American college students. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Participants  
There were 182 Native American participants in this study, 116 females and 66 
males. Their average age was 22.09 years with a standard deviation of 5.55. Participants 
were contacted by electronic mail using addresses for Native American students provided 
by the university’s academic affairs office. These potential participants were sent an 
electronic mail describing a study examining academic achievement and learning styles 
among university students. Participants were entered into a raffle for various prizes in 
exchange for participation. Information regarding the purpose of the study, requirements, 
and estimated length of participation were provided in the recruitment email. Participants 
were able to perform the web-based experiment from any computer connected to the 
internet and accessed at http://osu.cmapsych.net .
In terms of educational demographics the participants had 2.77 years of college. 
Their parents were also well educated 44% of their fathers and 43% of their mothers had 
graduated from college. Another 23% and 24% of their mothers and fathers respectively 
had at least some college experience. Only 2% of the mothers and 1% of the fathers had 
not graduated from high school. 
Experimental Procedure 
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Surgency Test. During the experimental portion of the procedure, all participants 
were informed: 
The primary purpose of this study is to understand why differences in 
social and economic success exist between Native American and 
Caucasian college students. Specifically, we are interested in students' 
performance on a newly identified personality factor known as 
"Surgency". Although the research on "Surgency" is fairly new, it has 
been shown to be a positive personality trait and correlates with academic 
achievement and college success. Please take a few minutes to complete 
the 25 item Surgency Test. 
Participants then completed a 25-item personality test purported to measure a 
characteristic called surgency (Schmader & Major, 1999). This bogus personality 
instrument was adapted from the original 50-item surgency test developed by Schmader 
& Major, 1999. Questions on the surgency test came from a variety of personality 
measures and did not have a consistent theme thus making it difficult to identify what the 
test was measuring.  
 After completion of the surgency test, participants were told, “As mentioned 
earlier, one of the goals of this study is to examine possible differences in "Surgency" 
between Native American and Caucasian college students. While the computer is scoring 
your Surgency Test, we would like you to review some recent data and a press release.” 
Participants viewed data tables that show comparisons between Caucasian and Native 
American college students on major indexes of academic achievement and economic 
success post graduation (see Appendices A & B).  The following statement also 
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accompanied the data table, “From this table, the data clearly demonstrate that Caucasian 
college students consistently out perform Native American college students following 
graduation. They enter into higher paying and higher status jobs upon graduation and 
they tend to reach higher levels of promotion than Native students. This may be due in 
part to the higher rates of admission and years of education in postgraduate training 
programs.”  
 All participants were then asked the same two questions to ensure attention to the 
task.  The first question asked was, “Post graduation, Caucasian students earn ____ 
compared to Native students.”  The correct response was, “three times as much.”  The 
second question asked was, “The rate of graduate admission for Caucasian students is 
almost _______ the rate for Native students.”  The correct response is, “five times.” If 
either question was answered incorrectly the data sheet reappeared.  Once participants 
studied the data sheet again they were asked the questions again.  This procedure was 
repeated until both questions were answered correctly. The data table questions were the 
same for both conditions.   
Legitimacy Manipulation.  For participants assigned to the legitimate condition, 
the data tables were accompanied by a press release from a fictitious organization, the 
National Association of Teaching Indigenous Values in Education (NATIVE Council) 
which read: 
The National Association of Teaching Indigenous Values in Education 
released its findings today. Spokesperson, Randall Yazzie (Navajo), 
stated, "The conclusion we draw from this research is that Caucasian 
college students appear to have greater academic ability and intelligence 
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than Native college students. The fact that they tend to be more successful 
in their careers after college is due to superior ability and intellect, and is 
not simply due to perceptions held by employers and graduate schools that 
Caucasian students are more intelligent than Native students." Yazzie 
went on to say that the research suggests that it is these superior abilities 
that place Caucasian students at a distinct advantage. In short, the Council 
found clear evidence that the higher status obtained by Caucasian students 
is a function of superior academic abilities (NATIVE, 2004). 
 Following presentation of the press release, participants were asked two more 
multiple choice questions regarding the information they just received: The NATIVE 
Council concluded that Caucasian students are more successful because of _____ ?”  The 
correct response was, “superior intellect.” The second question asked was: “The 
NATIVE Council found clear evidence that the high status obtained by Caucasian 
students is a function of _____ ?”  The correct response was, “superior academic 
abilities.” As with the data table questions if participants did not answer the questions 
correctly the press release reappeared and they were allowed another opportunity to 
answer the questions.  This procedure was repeated until the questions were answered 
correctly. 
For participants in the illegitimate condition, the data tables were accompanied by 
a press release by a fictitious organization the United States Council on Higher Education 
(USCHE): 
The US Council on Higher Education released its findings today. 
Spokesperson Phillip Martin stated, "The conclusion we draw from this 
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research is that Caucasian college students do not have more academic 
ability or intelligence than Native college students. The fact that they tend 
to be more successful in their careers is probably due to the perception 
held by employers and graduate schools that Caucasian students are more 
intelligent than Native students." Martin went on to say that the research 
suggests that this perception is inaccurate and places Native students at an 
unfair disadvantage. In short, the Council found no evidence that 
Caucasian students deserve higher status than Native students based on 
superior academic abilities (USCHE, 2004). 
 Following presentation of the illegitimate press release, participants were asked 
two more multiple choice questions regarding the information they just received: “The 
USCHE Council concluded that Caucasian students are more successful because of 
_____ ?”  And: “The USCHE Council found clear evidence that the high status obtained 
by Caucasian students is a function of _____ ?” Correct responses to the two questions 
were, “biases held by employers” and “biases held by graduate schools”, respectively. 
 Surgency Feedback. Following the legitimacy manipulation, participants in both 
conditions received their surgency test profile (see Appendix C), which showed their 
individual score (32.5), the cumulative average scores obtained by other Native American 
students (34.5), and the cumulative average scores obtained by Caucasian students (72.5) 
on a 0-100 scale.  Participants then complete the primary dependent measure.    
Dependent Measure 
 The primary dependent measure was derived from a 16-item scale that instructed 
participants to rate on a 7-point Likert scale (1= Not At All to 7= Extremely) the extent to 
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which they think each of the words listed describes Native Americans and Caucasian 
Americans in general (See Appendix D and E).  The words were derived from pilot 
testing of undergraduates who were asked to list the most common stereotypes they have 
heard about Native American and Caucasian American individuals.  The 16 items 
comprising the dependent measure were the most frequently listed positive stereotypes in 
that survey.  Eight of the 16 items are status irrelevant, or socioemotional, traits (e.g., 
friendly, warm, peaceful); eight of the 16 items are status relevant, or achievement, traits 
(e.g., intelligent, competitive, ambitious).  The order of presentation was 
counterbalanced, such that half of the participants provided ratings for Native Americans 
first; the other half rated Caucasian Americans first. 
 Jost and Burgess (2000) and Jost (2001) recommend using difference scores to 
simplify the assessment of ingroup and outgroup favoritism. This is accomplished by 
subtracting participants’ outgroup (i.e., Caucasian American) ratings for each item on the 
dependent measure from the respective ingroup (i.e., Native American) rating for that 
same item and then averaging these difference scores separately for status relevant and 
status irrelevant items. A positive difference score reflects greater ingroup preference for 
that domain; negative scores reflect an outgroup preference for that domain. 
Cultural Identification 
 While the participants were providing demographic information, cultural 
identification was also assessed. Four questions from Oetting and Beauvais’ orthogonal 
measure of cultural identification (1991) were used.  Participants were asked to rate their 
identification with both Native American and Caucasian American culture on a 4-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (A lot) to 4 (Not at all). The questions were, “Do you live by 
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or follow the American Indian way of life”, “Do you live by or follow the Caucasian 
American way of life?”; “Will you be a success in the American Indian way of life,” 
“Will you be a success in the Caucasian American way of life,” “Does your family live in 
the American Indian way of life,” “Does your family live in the Caucasian American way 
of life?”; and “Is your family a success in the American Indian way of life”, “Is your 
family a success in the Caucasian American way of life?”  Reliability estimates of this 4-
item scale have shown to be at least in the .70s (Oetting & Beauvais, 1991).  
Hypotheses  
Primary Hypothesis Ho(1): The primary hypothesis was that participants would 
demonstrate significantly less ingroup favoritism on ratings of status relevant 
(achievement) traits under conditions of feedback legitimacy.  In other words, the Native 
American minus Caucasian American difference scores on status relevant traits following 
legitimacy feedback should be significantly less than the Native American minus 
Caucasian American status relevant trait difference following illegitimate feedback. 
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Ho(1.a): Similarly, it was hypothesized that ratings on status irrelevant (socio-
emotional) traits should not differ significantly as a function of (il)legitimacy feedback. 
More specifically, there should be no significant difference on ingroup favoritism ratings 
on status irrelevant traits between participants in the legitimate and illegitimate feedback 
condition. 
Cultural Identification Hypothesis Ho(2): It was hypothesized that participants 
who endorse lower Native American identification on the cultural identification scale 
would demonstrate less ingroup favoritism on the trait rating measure.  Specifically, 
lower Native American identification would be significantly associated with lower Native 
American minus Caucasian American trait differences for both status relevant and status 
irrelevant dimensions regardless of legitimacy feedback.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
FINDINGS 
 
Data Preparation 
The primary dependent measure used to assess ingroup/outgroup favoritism was the 
difference scores derived from participant ratings for Native American descriptors minus 
ratings for Caucasian Americans descriptors. A positive difference between ratings 
reflects an ingroup preference for Native Americans and a negative difference between 
ratings reflects an outgroup preference for Caucasian Americans on that characteristic.  
Previous studies examining ingroup-outgroup bias have used this methodology (e.g., Jost 
& Burgess, 2000). Means for these difference scores were then computed for the eight 
characteristics comprising the Achievement (status relevant) and Socioemotional (status 
irrelevant) domains. A 2 (Legitimate/Illegitimate) x 2 (Achievement/Socioemotional) 
between/within mixed design analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to analyze the 
mean difference scores and simple effects analyses were used to further examine 
significant interaction effects. Pearson product-moment correlations were used to test the 
relationship between Native American cultural identification and ingroup favoritism for 
both status relevant (Achievement) and status irrelevant (Socioemotional) characteristics. 
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Results 
Primary Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of status value asymmetry varying as a function of legitimacy was 
tested using NA minus CA difference scores in a 2 (Legitimate/Illegitimate) x 2 (Status 
Relevant/Status Irrelevant) between/within mixed design analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 1 and the results of the analysis 
are presented in Table 2, and the interaction means are depicted graphically in Figure 1.  
Only the main effect for Status was significant with a moderate effect size. 
Participants rated themselves as possessing more status relevant (M =.77) than status 
irrelevant (M =.19) traits, F(1,180) = 86.58, p=.001, .p2 = .325, regardless of legitimacy 
manipulation. The main effect for Legitimacy and the Legitimacy x Status interaction 
were both nonsignificant.  Although participants did show some decrease in status 
relevant ratings when exposed to legitimate feedback this decrease was not significant.  It 
was, however, in the predicted direction. 
 In order to more closely examine these data, a 2 (Legitimate/Illegitimate) x 2 
(Status Relevant/Status Irrelevant) x 2 (Native American/Caucasian American) 
between/within/within mixed design ANOVA was performed. The means and standard 
deviations are presented in Table 3 and the results of the analysis are presented in Table 
4. The interaction means are depicted graphically in Figure 2.   
 Main effects for both Status and Race were significant, with small effect sizes. 
Participants rated status relevant traits (M = 4.97) significantly higher than status 
irrelevant traits (M = 4.80), F(1,180) = 25.45, p =.001, , .p2 = .120, regardless of legitimacy 
condition or target group (Native Americans /Caucasian American).  They also rated 
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themselves (M = 5.15) significantly higher than Caucasian Americans (M = 4.62), F(1,180) 
= 49.43, p = .001, .p2 = .215 on both status relevant and status irrelevant dimensions 
independent of legitimacy manipulation. 
In addition to these two main effects the interactions between Legitimacy x Race 
and Status x Race were also significant. The two-way interaction means for Legitimacy x 
Race are shown in Figure 3. Comparing interaction means using a simple effects analysis 
revealed small effect sizes and showed that in the legitimate condition Native Americans 
(M = 5.12) rated themselves significantly higher, across status domains, than Caucasian 
Americans (M = 4.75). They also rated themselves (M = 5.17) significantly higher than 
Caucasian Americans (M = 4.50) in the illegitimate condition. It can also be seen from 
Figure 3 that the ratings for Caucasian Americans was significantly higher under 
conditions of legitimacy (M = 4.75) than illegitimacy (M = 4.50). Native Americans 
ratings of themselves was not significantly different whether given legitimate (M = 5.12)
or illegitimate (M = 5.17) information. 
 The two-way interaction means for Status x Race are shown in Figure 4. 
Subsequent simple effects analysis revealed low medium to small effect sizes. There was 
a significant comparison for Status, with participants rating themselves higher on status 
relevant traits (M = 5.38) than status irrelevant traits (M = 4.91); however, when rating 
Caucasian Americans, ratings for status relevant traits (M = 4.55) were not significantly 
different from the ratings for status irrelevant traits (M = 4.70). Within the status relevant 
domain, participants rated themselves (M = 5.38) significantly higher than Caucasian 
Americans (M = 4.55). For status irrelevant traits, effects were not as large, but again 
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participants rated themselves (M = 4.91) significantly higher than Caucasian Americans 
(M = 4.70). 
Secondary Hypothesis 
 It was also hypothesized that participants who endorsed lower Native American 
identification on the cultural identification scale would demonstrate less ingroup 
favoritism as measured by Native American minus Caucasian American trait difference 
scores for both status relevant and status irrelevant dimensions regardless of legitimacy 
feedback condition. The prediction was partially supported in that greater identification 
with Caucasian American culture was associated with less ingroup favoritism regardless 
of status domain or legitimacy condition. Correlations between Caucasian cultural 
identification and group favoritism (NA – CA ratings) were significant for Status 
Irrelevant traits in both the legitimate (r = .21, p = .004) and illegitimate (r = .18, p = .02)
conditions.  Similar significant correlations were observed for Status Relevant traits 
under conditions of legitimacy (r = .25, p =.001) and illegitimacy (r = .27, p = .001). It is 
also important to point out that the mean rating for identification with Native American 
culture was 2.86 (SD = .95) and 1.37 (SD = .60) for Caucasian American culture. This 
difference was significant (t(180) = 21.23, p =.001) and indicated a stronger identification 
with Caucasian American culture than with Native American culture. 
 In general the data revealed that Native American participants in this study 
strongly identified with Caucasian American culture and valued status relevant 
achievement characteristics over status irrelevant socioemotional characteristics.  They 
also perceived status relevant achievement characteristics to be more descriptive of 
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Native Americans than Caucasian Americans. Under these circumstances the legitimacy 
manipulation had only a minimal nonsignificant effect.  
Exploratory Analysis 
 Cultural Identification. In light of the importance of cultural identification to the 
findings, further examination of the cultural identification measure was carried out. 
LaFromboise, Hardin, Gerton and Gerton (1993) delineated seven process variables 
which can be used to differentiate between the various models of cultural acquisition.  
 These process variables have relevance in determining which model best 
describes the Native Americans participants in the present study. The first four of these 
process variables are concerned with culture of origin, they are: contact with the culture 
of origin, loyalty to culture of origin, involvement with the culture of origin, and 
acceptance by members of the culture of origin. Questions on the Oetting and Beauvais 
(1991) cultural identification instrument most directly related to these process variables 
are “Do you live by or follow the American Indian way of life”, and “Do you live by or 
follow the Caucasian American way of life?” (1 = A Lot to 4 = Not at all). Mean 
responses on these items were 3.00 and 1.30 for American Indian and Caucasian 
American, respectively. With regard to the American Indian way of life 72% responded 
with a 3 or a 4; and for the Caucasian way of life 98% responded with a 1 or 2. This 
clearly indicates that most of the Native Americans in this sample had little contact and 
involvement with their culture of origin. 
 The remaining process variables address second culture involvement, they are: 
contact with the second culture, affiliation with the second culture, and acceptance by 
members of the second culture. The Oetting and Beauvais (1991) instrument asks the 
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questions, “Will you be a success in the American Indian way of life,” “Will you be a 
success in the Caucasian American way of life,”? Response means were 3.02 and 1.31, 
respectively. Only 29% of Native American participants thought they would be 
successful in the American Indian way of life, whereas 96% thought they would be 
successful in the Caucasian American way of life – indicating substantial involvement 
and affiliation with the majority culture. 
 Status Domain. To gain a more precise description of participants’ perceptions of 
domain items, an exploratory factor analysis was used to isolate the traits contributing 
most significantly to perceived status irrelevant domains for Native Americans and status 
relevant domains for Caucasian Americans. Because the illegitimacy manipulation could 
introduce a confounding bias in the ratings, the factor analysis excluded these 
participants. Separate principle component analyses, using a varimax rotation with a two 
factor solution, were conducted for status irrelevant trait ratings of Native Americans and 
status relevant trait ratings of Caucasian Americans. While this was an exploratory 
analysis the two factor solution was chosen because there were two levels of the 
independent variable manipulated and it was expected that the loadings would be 
distributed accordingly. A separate analysis without forcing two factors produced results 
that were not substantially different from those from the two factor solution. For this 
reason the results from the two factor solution are reported here. The varimax rotation is 
traditionally described as useful in cleaning up the factors because it yields factors that 
have high intra-factor correlations and low inter-factor correlations making the 
interpretation of the factors easier.  
44
The inter-correlations among items are given in Table 5 and the factor loadings 
from the factor analyses are presented in Table 6. The KMOs for these analyses were .88 
and .82 for Native Americans and Caucasian Americans respectively. The first 
component in the analysis of the item ratings for Native Americans accounted for 49% of 
the variance. In this component two status irrelevant traits predominated, noble with a 
loading of .81, and peaceful, with a .68 loading. The first component in the analysis of 
item ratings for Caucasian Americans accounted for 42% of the variance and revealed 
two predominant status relevant traits, ambitious (.69), and intelligent (.66). 
 Using these traits, ambitious/intelligent for status relevant and noble/ peaceful for 
status irrelevant, the data were reanalyzed using a 2 (Legitimate/Illegitimate) x 2 (Status 
Relevant/Status Irrelevant) x 2 (Native American/Caucasian American) 
between/within/within mixed design ANOVA. The means and standard deviations are 
presented in Table 7 and the results of the analysis are presented in Table 8. The 
interaction means are depicted graphically in Figure 5.  
 Of the three main effects only Race was significant with participants rating 
themselves (M = 5.37) significantly higher than Caucasian Americans (M = 4.67), F(1,180) 
= 65.88, p =.001, .p2 = .268 (i.e., collapsing across Status and Legitimacy).  The Status x 
Race two-way interaction was also significant, F(1,180) = 269.89, p =.001, , .p2 = .600, a 
comparatively large effect size. The means for this interaction are depicted in Figure 6.  
 The analysis of simple effects revealed medium effect sizes and showed 
significant comparisons within both the Status and Race variables. For Status participants 
rated themselves higher on irrelevant traits (M = 5.89) than relevant traits (M = 4.84) and 
rated Caucasian Americans higher on relevant traits (M = 5.20) than irrelevant traits (M =
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4.14). Comparing Races, participants rated themselves (M = 5.89) significantly higher 
than Caucasian Americans (M = 4.14) for status irrelevant traits and significantly lower 
on status relevant traits (M = 4.84 as compared to 5.20). That is to say, these participants 
evidenced strong ingroup favoritism for the socioemotional traits of noble and peaceful, 
and to a somewhat lesser extent demonstrate outgroup favoritism for the achievement 
traits of ambitious and intelligent. 
 Using these traits and the NA – CA difference calculations as proposed in the 
primary analysis, clearly shows this pattern of status value asymmetry, with ingroup 
favoritism for status irrelevant traits and marginal outgroup favoritism for status relevant 
traits (see Figure 7).  The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 9 and the 
results of a 2 (Legitimate/Illegitimate) x 2 (Status Relevant/Status Irrelevant) 
between/within mixed design analysis of variance are presented in Table 10. The main 
effect for Status was significant, with participants rating themselves higher on status 
irrelevant traits (M = 1.75) than status relevant traits. The opposite pattern was observed 
for ratings of Caucasian Americans (M = -.36), F(1,180) = 269.89, p=.001, .p2 = .600, a 
large effect size. The main effect for Legitimacy and the interaction of Legitimacy x 
Status were both nonsignificant.      
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
System Justification Theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994) attempts to explain why members of 
minority groups often exhibit a preference for characteristics associated with higher 
status groups even at the expense of their own group. In so doing, members of lower 
status groups justify existing status hierarchies which serve to perpetuate inequality. The 
status beliefs which maintain these hierarchies: a) create social distinctions regarding the 
competence and worth of higher status groups relative to lower status groups, and b) 
ascribe positive, but less valued, characteristics to the subordinate group as 
compensation. The consequence of this motivation to justify the system produces an 
internalization of inequality which unites those who are socially devalued with a 
collective social reality legitimizing their low status. Consensus beliefs about status are in 
this way objectified and socially validated. This means that perceived legitimacy is 
crucial in understanding the phenomenon of outgroup bias.  
 System Justification Theory predictions of outgroup favoritism and internalized 
inequality have been extensively investigated among a number of marginalized groups 
including African American, Latino Americans, and lower socioeconomic populations 
(Jost et al. 2003); however, it has not been demonstrated among Native Americans. It is 
because Native Americans represent one of the most disadvantaged and 
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socioeconomically deprived racial minority groups in America, combined with the 
absence of research on this population, that the present investigation was undertaken. 
 Replicating a procedure developed by Schmader et al. (2001), perceived 
legitimacy of status beliefs was manipulated regarding Native and Caucasian American 
achievement.  Following this legitimacy manipulation, participants rated Native and 
Caucasian Americans on status relevant (achievement) and status irrelevant 
(socioemotional) characteristics, with the expectation that achievement characteristics 
would be perceived as more descriptive of Caucasian Americans and socioemotional 
characteristics would be perceived as more descriptive of Native Americans in the 
legitimacy condition. 
 From the primary analysis, there was no evidence that legitimacy manipulation 
influenced participants’ perception of status relevant/irrelevant traits.  First, the simplest 
explanation is that the legitimacy manipulation and, consequently, the illegitimacy 
feedback was not significantly robust to discount the message that Native Americans 
under achieve because they are intellectually inferior.  In other words, the participants 
embraced the stereotype so firmly that the illegitimacy manipulation failed to provide 
adequate counterfactual information to undo the stereotype.   
 Another potential explanation for the findings is that the outgroup bias effect does 
not hold for Native Americans, as it has been demonstrated for women, African 
Americans, and other minorities (e g. Jost et al., 2003). Alternatively, it may only hold 
for specific Native American populations who identify strongly with their culture and not 
for Native Americans who do not. The one unambiguous conclusion to be drawn from 
these data is that the Native American college students participating in this study 
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identified very little with Native American culture and/or way of life. The data clearly 
demonstrate that this sample identified more strongly with Caucasian American culture 
compared to Native American culture. 
 For this reason, the absence of an outgroup bias effect may have resulted from 
participants ascribing a number of status relevant achievement characteristics (e.g., 
efficient, dependable, and competitive) more readily to their own group than they did to 
the hypothesized Caucasian American outgroup.  In other words, because this sample was 
so highly acculturated, the status relevant trait preferences observed were in all likelihood 
based on participants’ self identification of Caucasian culture.  Under these circumstances 
a status value asymmetry effect would not be predicted.  
 The predictions from System Justification Theory would be most relevant for 
Native Americans who are not acculturated, that is, Native Americans who adhere more 
closely to minority status beliefs due to disadvantage in terms of material resources and 
opportunities. The relatively high degree of identification with white culture suggests that 
the Native American participants in the present study probably do not fit this description 
ideologically, socially, politically, and/or economically. This suggests strongly that the 
present sample was not comprised of traditional Native Americans, but rather highly 
acculturated individuals. That is Americans first, with a Native American ancestry. Thus, 
from the perspective of System Justification Theory it seems reasonable to assume that 
because participants identified so closely with dominant culture they did not experience 
the ideological dissonance associated with outgroup favoritism.  Consequently, they did 
not demonstrate the status value asymmetry effect. 
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In addition, it is evident from the comparisons of individual items that the 
operational definitions for the status domains used in this study are suspect, at least for 
these participants. Compared to other studies of outgroup bias the primary outcome trait 
measure included in the present study may have included too many items that did not 
accurately reflect the desired socioemotional and achievement domains.  This lack of 
commonality among items may have further mitigated the outgroup bias effect. This is 
also part of the reason why the observed effect sizes were low. From comparisons of 
Native and Caucasian Americans on each individual item, the two socioemotional traits 
that were most frequently endorsed to describe Native Americans were noble and 
peaceful; and the two achievement traits which emerged as most descriptive of Caucasian 
Americans were ambitious and intelligent. The remainder of the traits which produced 
differences were distributed across the domains.  
Despite acculturation and measurement issues, it is interesting that some evidence 
for outgroup bias was observed when trait factor scores were used. As with the analysis 
of individual items, the exploratory factor analyses revealed  ambitious/intelligent as the 
most prominent status relevant traits used to describe Caucasians and noble/peaceful as 
the most prominent status irrelevant Native American traits. Subsequent analyses using 
these domain traits demonstrated a status value asymmetry effect with, strong ingroup 
favoritism for noble/peaceful and a smaller outgroup bias effect for ambitious/intelligent. 
These results suggest that future research should use fewer and more salient items 
reflecting domain specificity.  
 In future research it would also be interesting to use character traits reflecting 
opposite poles of a dimension such that favorable and unfavorable ratings could be 
52
obtained for each trait. This procedure would make it possible to use measures developed 
by Jost and Burgess (2000) to assess ingroup ambivalence; that is psychological conflict 
resulting the valuing of status relevant ideals and ingroup favoritism. Another 
methodological modification of benefit would be to change the procedure such that 
participants are less likely to develop a response set by using a limited hold requiring that 
each item be viewed for a fixed amount of time. The cultural identification instrument 
could also be modified to include items design to gain a better perspective on the 
dynamics of Native American assimilation by incorporating content concerning the 
process variables identified by LaFromboise et al. (1993). It remains to be seen whether 
the assimilation identified in this study is unique to these participants as a stratified 
segment of the Native American population or reflects the assimilation of Native 
Americans in general. 
 In sum, results of this study neither confirm nor disconfirm the primary 
hypothesis. Perhaps this outcome is unique to Native Americans as a people because they 
are more acculturated, relative to other racial minority groups. Conversely it could be 
argued that because the current study did not access a demographically deprived group it 
lacks external validity.  It could also be argued that the study lacked internal validity in 
that the analysis of individual items revealed contradictory results across status domains.  
Future endeavors should rely on normed data for operationally defining status relevant 
and irrelevant traits and draw from samples that fit the profile of individuals who highly 
identify with Native American culture. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A 
 
Legitimate Condition Data Table 
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From this table, the data clearly demonstrate that Caucasian college students 
consistently outperform Native college students following graduation. They 
enter into higher paying and higher status jobs upon graduation and they 
tend to reach higher levels of promotion than Native students. This may be 
due in part to the higher rates of admission and years of education in 
postgraduate training programs. Please review the follow table.  You will be 
asked two brief questions concerning the table. 
Surgency 
Table 1. Comparison of Caucasian and Native American College Students on Major Indexes of 
Academic Achievement and Economic Success Post-Graduation 
CAUCASIAN                  NATIVE 
INCOME (1ST JOB) 
$36,000                   $18,000 
STATUS OF PROFESSIONS ENTERED 3 1.5 
1 = MANUAL LABOR/SERVICE 
2 = ENTRY LEVEL BUSINESS/RETAIL 
3 = MANAGEMENT/ADMINISTRATION 
4 = PROFESSIONAL 
CAREER PROMOTIONS 5 2
RATES OF ADMISSION TO GRADUATE SCHOOL  62.5%           13.4% 
(MASTERS, PH.D., M.D., LAW) 
YEARS OF POSTGRADUATE EDUCATION COMPLETED 5.5                2.5 
Source: National Association of Teaching Indigenous Values in Education 
(NATIVE, 2004) 
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Appendix B 
 
Illegitimate Condition Data Table 
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From this table, the data clearly demonstrate that Caucasian college students 
consistently outperform Native college students following graduation. They 
enter into higher paying and higher status jobs upon graduation and they 
tend to reach higher levels of promotion than Native students. This may be 
due in part to the higher rates of admission and years of education in 
postgraduate training programs. Please review the follow table.  You will be 
asked two brief questions concerning the table. 
 
Surgency 
Table 1. Comparison of Caucasian and Native American College Students on Major Indexes of 
Academic Achievement and Economic Success Post-Graduation 
CAUCASIAN                  NATIVE 
INCOME (1ST JOB) 
$36,000                   $18,000 
STATUS OF PROFESSIONS ENTERED 3 1.5 
1 = MANUAL LABOR/SERVICE 
2 = ENTRY LEVEL BUSINESS/RETAIL 
3 = MANAGEMENT/ADMINISTRATION 
4 = PROFESSIONAL 
CAREER PROMOTIONS 5 2
RATES OF ADMISSION TO GRADUATE SCHOOL  62.5%           13.4% 
(MASTERS, PH.D., M.D., LAW) 
YEARS OF POSTGRADUATE EDUCATION COMPLETED 5.5                2.5 
Source: United States Council on Higher Education (USCHE, 2004) 
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Appendix C 
 
Surgency Feedback 
68
Surgency Test Profile 
 
Subject Sample: 268 Group: Native American  
Study Cite: OSU Session Number: 8
The following chart represent your score on the Surgency test: 32.5
Your Score on the Surgency Test: 32.5 
0 10 20 30 X 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
WELL BELOW AVERAGE 
 
AVERAGE 
 
WELL ABOVE AVERAGE 
For comparison purposes, the cumulative average scores obtained by other Native 
American students and cumulative average scores obtained by Caucasian students are 
also shown below: 
 
The Average Surgency Score for Native American Group: 34.5 
0 10 20  30  X 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
WELL BELOW AVERAGE 
 
AVERAGE 
 
WELL ABOVE AVERAGE 
The Average Surgency Score for Caucasian Group: 72.5 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60    70X 80 90 100 
WELL BELOW AVERAGE 
 
AVERAGE 
 
WELL ABOVE AVERAGE 
OSU Sample 268; SESSION #8 
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Appendix D 
 
Dependent Measure 
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On the scale below check the box corresponding to the number that indicates the extent 
to which you think each of the words describes Caucasian Americans AND Native 
Americans in general. Please rate each word for both Caucasian Americans and for 
Native Americans. 
 
EXAMPLE:     Caucasian Americans                     Native Americans 
 
Experienced    1        2       3       4       5       6       7                       1        2       3       4       5       6       7         
 
Caucasian Americans                      Native Americans 
 
Not At All             Extremely      Not At All                        Extremely 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1.   Warm 1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7     
 
2.   Hardworking   1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7      
 
3.   Friendly 1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7    
 
4.   Ambitious 1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7       
 
5.   Spiritual 1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7       
 
6.   Competitive 1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7       
 
7.   Honorable 1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7       
 
8.   Responsible 1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7       
 
9.   Peaceful 1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7       
 
10. Efficient 1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7       
 
11. Proud 1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7       
 
12. Practical 1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7   
 
13. Noble 1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7       
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14. Dependable 1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7       
 
15. Traditional 1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7       
 
16. Intelligent 1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7      
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Appendix E 
 
Dependent Measure 
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On the scale below check the box corresponding to the number that indicates the extent 
to which you think each of the words describes Caucasian Americans AND Native 
Americans in general. Please rate each word for both Caucasian Americans and for 
Native Americans. 
 
EXAMPLE:            Native Americans                   Caucasian Americans 
 
Experienced    1        2       3       4       5       6       7                       1        2       3       4       5       6       7         
 
Native Americans                    Caucasian Americans 
 
Not At All             Extremely      Not At All                        Extremely 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1.   Warm 1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7     
 
2.   Hardworking   1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7      
 
3.   Friendly 1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7    
 
4.   Ambitious 1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7       
 
5.   Spiritual 1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7       
 
6.   Competitive 1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7       
 
7.   Honorable 1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7       
 
8.   Responsible 1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7       
 
9.   Peaceful 1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7       
 
10. Efficient 1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7       
 
11. Proud 1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7       
 
12. Practical 1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7   
 
13. Noble 1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7       
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14. Dependable 1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7       
 
15. Traditional 1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7       
 
16. Intelligent 1         2        3        4        5        6        7          1         2        3        4        5        6        7      
 
75
TABLE 1 
 
Legitimacy x Status Means and Standard Deviations for NA – CA Difference Scores. 
Status Relevant Status Irrelevant
Legitimate .68(1.18) .07(.80)
Illegittimate .85(1.11) .31(.89)
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TABLE 2 
 
Legitimacy x Status Analysis of Variance Summary for NA – CA Difference Scores. 
 Source SS df MS F p  p2
Legitimacy 3.84 1 3.84 2.28 0.13 0.012
Error 303.40 180 1.69
Status 30.36 1 30.36 86.58 0.00 0.325
Legitimacy x Status 0.10 1 0.10 0.29 0.59 0.002
Error 63.12 180 0.35
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TABLE 3 
 
Legitimacy x Status x Race Means and Standard Deviations. 
Status Irelevant                   Status Relevant
NA CA NA CA
Legitimate 4.91(1.16) 4.84(1.27) 5.33(1.05) 4.65(1.00)
Illegitimate 4.92(1.20) 4.56(1.02) 5.43(1.02) 4.45(.98)
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TABLE 4 
 
Legitimacy x Status x Race Analysis of Variance Summary 
Source SS df MS F p  p
2
Legitimacy 1.62 1 1.62 1.08 0.300 0.006
Error 270.87 180 1.50
Status 4.76 1 4.76 25.45 0.000 0.120
Legitimacy x Status 0.27 1 0.27 1.47 0.228 0.008
Error 33.67 180 0.19
Race 49.91 1 49.91 49.43 0.000 0.215
Legitimacy x Race 4.06 1 4.06 4.02 0.046 0.021
Error 181.75 180 1.01
Status x Race 17.42 1 17.42 96.87 0.000 0.349
Leg x Status x Race 0.00 1 0.00 0.01 0.904 0.000
Error 32.37 180 0.18
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TABLE 5 
 
Inter-correlations among Items for both Native Americans and Caucasian Americans. 
Caucasian Americans
 Warm Friendly Spritual Honorable Peaceful Proud Noble Traditional Hardwrking Ambitious Competitive Responsible Efficient Practical Dependable Intelligent
Warm 0.19 0.52 0.20 0.15 0.15 0.36 0.22 0.09 0.32 -0.11 0.08 0.34 0.17 0.13 0.17
Friendly 0.44 0.25 0.32 0.13 0.24 0.31 0.51 0.23 0.37 0.02 0.35 0.29 0.43 0.05 0.40
Spritual 0.57 0.42 0.36 0.21 0.32 0.43 0.39 0.22 0.29 0.12 0.23 0.42 0.27 0.18 0.34
Honorable 0.38 0.69 0.50 0.11 0.55 0.16 0.41 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.06 0.18 0.38 0.03 0.53
Peaceful 0.35 0.32 0.51 0.38 0.09 0.63 0.31 0.44 0.33 0.26 0.18 0.46 0.32 0.47 0.30
Proud 0.15 0.37 0.22 0.49 0.45 0.20 0.30 0.11 0.31 0.13 0.11 0.15 0.29 0.04 0.57
Noble 0.44 0.48 0.54 0.49 0.61 0.33 0.49 0.63 0.52 0.16 0.24 0.64 0.37 0.53 0.38
Traditional 0.36 0.62 0.45 0.65 0.41 0.57 0.57 0.41 0.53 0.13 0.32 0.50 0.63 0.29 0.47
Native Americans Hardwrking 0.41 0.34 0.46 0.44 0.68 0.34 0.62 0.49 0.44 0.26 0.33 0.50 0.34 0.63 0.27
Ambitious 0.46 0.59 0.47 0.69 0.52 0.54 0.55 0.73 0.59 0.01 0.45 0.38 0.51 0.25 0.47
Competitive 0.35 0.26 0.33 0.20 0.60 0.34 0.50 0.26 0.37 0.43 0.14 0.32 0.08 0.31 0.01
Responsible 0.39 0.38 0.29 0.31 0.46 0.37 0.47 0.42 0.32 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.37 0.28 0.25
Efficient 0.39 0.25 0.45 0.25 0.52 0.16 0.67 0.39 0.55 0.43 0.63 0.50 0.49 0.58 0.34
Practical 0.50 0.64 0.49 0.64 0.45 0.36 0.58 0.79 0.54 0.68 0.25 0.41 0.46 0.30 0.55
Dependable 0.30 0.20 0.35 0.23 0.78 0.35 0.45 0.30 0.64 0.48 0.57 0.39 0.50 0.37 0.26
Intelligent 0.38 0.51 0.39 0.49 0.38 0.30 0.56 0.60 0.37 0.56 0.43 0.53 0.46 0.62 0.32
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TABLE 6 
 
Factor Analyses for Native Americans and Caucasian Americans. 
Native Americans     Caucasian Americans
 Component  Component
1 2 1 2
Warm 0.12 0.74 Warm 0.36 0.30
Friendly 0.09 0.73 Friendly 0.54 0.22
Status Spritual 0.20 0.62 Spritual 0.47 0.37
Irrelevant Honorable -0.07 0.82 Honorable 0.82 -0.06
Peaceful 0.68 0.22 Peaceful 0.04 0.67
Proud 0.32 0.34 Proud 0.76 -0.06
Noble 0.81 0.25 Noble 0.20 0.80
Traditional 0.54 0.57 Traditional 0.64 0.42
Hardwrking 0.68 0.19 Hardwrking 0.18 0.74
Ambitious 0.45 0.67 Ambitious 0.69 0.21
Competitive 0.77 0.05 Competitive 0.29 0.29
Status Responsible 0.45 0.50 Responsible 0.54 0.25
Relevant Efficient 0.78 0.25 Efficient 0.25 0.78
Practical 0.43 0.65 Practical 0.47 0.48
Dependable 0.83 0.10 Dependable 0.07 0.73
Intelligent 0.33 0.58 Intelligent 0.66 0.17
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TABLE 7 
 
Legitimacy x Status x Race Means and Standard Deviations using Ambitious/Intelligent 
for Status Relevant and Noble/Peaceful for Status Irrelevant.
Status Irelevant                   Status Relevant
NA CA NA CA
Legitimate 5.90(1.16) 4.18(1.27) 4.91(1.20) 5.25(1.02)
Illegitimate 5.88(1.05) 4.10(1.02) 4.77(1.00) 5.15(0.98)
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TABLE 8 
 
Legitimacy x Status x Race Analysis of Variance using Ambitious/Intelligent for Status 
Relevant and Noble/Peaceful for Status Irrelevant.
Source SS df MS F p  p
2
Legitimacy 1.24 1 1.24 0.58 0.45 0.003
Error 383.03 180 2.13
Status 0.01 1 0.01 0.02 0.88 0.000
Legitimacy x Status 0.27 1 0.27 0.48 0.49 0.003
Error 100.22 180 0.56
Race 88.62 1 88.62 65.88 0.00 0.268
Legitimacy x Race 0.01 1 0.01 0.01 0.92 0.000
Error 242.12 180 1.35
Status x Race 202.55 1 202.55 269.89 0.00 0.600
Leg x Status x Race 0.11 1 0.11 0.15 0.70 0.001
Error 135.09 180 0.75
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TABLE 9 
 
Legitimacy x Status Means and Standard Deviations for NA – CA Difference Scores with 
the Status Relevant Traits Ambitious/Intelligent and the Status Relevant Traits 
Noble/Peaceful. 
Status Relevant Status Irrelevant
Legitimate -.34(1.43) 1.72(1.71)
Illegittimate -.37(1.13) 1.79(1.45)
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TABLE 10 
 
Legitimacy x Status Analysis of Variance for NA – CA Difference Scores with the Status 
Relevant Traits Ambitious/Intelligent and the Status Relevant Traits Noble/Peaceful. 
 Source SS df MS F p  p2
Legitimacy 0.02 1 0.02 0.01 0.92 0.000
Error 484.23 180 2.69
Status 405.10 1 405.10 269.89 0.00 0.600
Legitimacy x Status 0.22 1 0.22 0.15 0.70 0.001
Error 270.18 180 1.50
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FIGURE 4 
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FIGURE 5 
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